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This paper shows that the Mortensen-Pissarides (MP) model requires endogenous
separation to explain the volatility of unemployment. I estimate a version of the MP
model with wage rigidity and permanent shocks to match productivity. The model gen-
erates su¢ cient volatility in unemployment, vacancies, job-￿nding and job-separation
despite relatively low worker outside options. I then re-estimate the model while re-
stricting the separation rate to be constant and show that, even though the estimation
procedure ￿nds the best ￿tting model, the model predicts too little variance in unem-
ployment and too much variance in the job-￿nding rate. Based on this result I conclude
that models of unemployment ￿ uctuations need endogenous separation rates to explain
unemployment ￿ uctuations.
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The Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) (MP) search and matching model is the dominant par-
adigm for studying unemployment ￿ uctuations. Shimer (2005b) argues that the separation
rate is relatively acyclical and contributes little to unemployment ￿ uctuations. He advocates
versions of the MP model that explain unemployment ￿ uctuations primarily with movements
in the job-￿nding rate. Recent work (e.g. Hall (2005a), Gertler & Trigari (2006)) follows
Shimer￿ s reasoning and attempts to explain unemployment ￿ uctuations with a constant sep-
aration rate. These papers suggest the MP model does not need endogenous separation to
explain unemployment ￿ uctuations. Instead, this strand of the literature aims to explain
unemployment ￿ uctuations by using wage rigidity to amplify the response of the job-￿nding
rate to changes in productivity.
However, recent empirical papers dispute Shimer￿ s claim of an acyclical separation rate.
As Elsby et al. (2007) conclude, "A complete understanding of cyclical unemployment re-
quires an explanation of countercyclical in￿ ow rates." Noting this evidence, another strand
of the literature (e.g. Ramey (2008) and Menzio & Shi (2009)) focuses on modeling endoge-
nous separation. However these models su⁄er from the Shimer puzzle (Shimer (2005a)) i.e.
they generates too little variance in the job ￿nding rate.
Both strands of the literature are important contributions to our understanding of un-
employment ￿ uctuations. However, since both strands underestimate the importance of one
channel in generating unemployment ￿ uctuations (either job-￿nding or job-separation) nei-
ther can fully evaluate the importance of job-separation in contributing to unemployment
￿ uctuations. My paper bridges the gap between these two approaches. I estimate a version
of the MP model with endogenous separation and wage rigidity. I estimate the model using
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The model is consistent with the observed
levels of unemployment, vacancy, and job-￿nding and separation rate volatility as well as
the signs of all the correlation coe¢ cients. Importantly, the presence of wage rigidity allows
the model to match the Beveridge curve (the negative correlation between vacancies and
1unemployment) even with variation in the separation rate.
This paper then can evaluate the Hall (2005b) and Shimer (2005b) claim that models of
unemployment ￿ uctuations do not need variation in the job-separation rate to explain the
volatility of unemployment. It answers the question: Do models of unemployment ￿ uctu-
ations need variation in the separation rate? I ￿nd that the answer is yes. I re-estimate
a version of the model with a constant separation rate and show that the overall ￿t of the
model is much poorer. Since I use GMM to estimate the constant separation rate model, I
show that the best ￿tting constant separation rate model, found by searching over the entire
parameter space, will predict too little variation in unemployment and too much variation in
the job-￿nding rate. This result is the main contribution of the paper. I do not propose a new
solution to the Shimer puzzle, but use existing explanations (i.e. wage rigidity) to elucidate
the importance of separation rate ￿ uctuations in explaining unemployment volatility.
The papers in the literature closest to mine are Ramey (2008) and Menzio & Shi (2009).
Both papers point out that the Mortensen-Pissarides model fails to generate su¢ cient unem-
ployment volatility without an endogenous separation rate. My paper di⁄ers from their work
for two reasons. Firstly, I allow for wage rigidity in the model. Therefore, my model does not
su⁄er from the Shimer puzzle, i.e. it is able to generate su¢ cient volatility in the job ￿nding
rate. What I do is start with a model that generates su¢ cient volatility in job-￿nding and
job-separation rate. Then, I show that when job-separation is held constant the model fails
to match the volatility of unemployment. The baseline models of Ramey and Menzio and
Shi do not generate job-￿nding volatility that matches the standard deviation of the job-
￿nding rate seen in the data. Based on their results one wonders if a model with su¢ cient
job-￿nding rate volatility could explain unemployment ￿ uctuations without separation rate
￿ uctuations. I show that the answer is no. Even a model that is able to generate su¢ cient
volatility in job-￿nding will not generate su¢ cient volatility of unemployment.
Secondly, instead of calibrating the model, I estimate the model using GMM. This method
allows me to show that there is no calibration of the constant separation rate model for which
2there will be su¢ cient unemployment volatility. In this sense, my approach is immune to the
calibration critique that Hagedorn & Manovskii (2006) level against Shimer (2005a). They
argue that Shimer￿ s results are sensitive to the choice of calibration for key parameters. Since
my estimation process ￿nds the best ￿tting model, I know that there is no calibration of the
exogenous separation rate model that can explain the volatility of unemployment.
My paper also di⁄ers from the empirical work of Elsby et al. (2007). They show that the
separation rate is counter-cyclical and contributes empirically to unemployment ￿ uctuations.
However, their work leaves open the question addressed in this paper: while the separation
rate is counter-cyclical, is assuming an acyclical separation rate in theoretical models a
reasonable approximation if the goal is only to explain the behavior of unemployment and
vacancies? I show that the answer is no. The model needs variation in the separation rate
to match unemployment, vacancy and job-￿nding rate moments alone.
Admittedly, the baseline model is not strikingly novel. It is a simpli￿ed version of the
original MP model (only two persistent job speci￿c productivity levels) with wage rigidity
based on Hall (2005a). However, the model has several advantages. It can be linearized
and estimated by GMM. I estimate the model￿ s structural parameters, and since the model
explains the key moments of the data, it can be used e⁄ectively in policy analysis. It may very
well be one of the simplest models consistent with the observed volatility of unemployment,
vacancies, job-￿nding and the job-separation rate.
Finally, note that this paper explains unemployment, job-￿nding and job-separation rate
￿ uctuations assuming that worker outside options are low. (I do not use the Hagedorn &
Manovskii (2006) calibration where unemployment is almost as valuable as work.) This is
the most common view in the literature. In fact, Shimer (2005a), Hall (2005a) and Gertler
& Trigari (2006) all assume that unemployment is about 40% as valuable as work. Hall
& Milgrom (2008) estimate that worker￿ s outside options are 75% as valuable as work.
Additionally, as Costain & Reiter (2003) point out, models with a value of work near that of
unemployment generate responses of unemployment to labor market policies that are much
3too large. They estimate worker outside options of 75% the value of work by matching the
observed response of unemployment to labor market policies. Therefore, I assume worker
outside options equal to 75% the value of work.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two describes the baseline model with
endogenous separation and wage rigidity. Section three explains the model solution and
the GMM estimation and shows that this model is consistent with the observed standard
deviations of unemployment, job-￿nding and job-separation. In section four, I demonstrate
that once the separation rate is restricted to be constant, the model ￿ts the data poorly:
predicting too much variance in job-￿nding and too little variance in unemployment. Section
￿ve discusses the robustness of the results. Finally, section six concludes.
2 Vulnerable Jobs Model
2.1 Theoretical Model
2.1.1 Informal Description
In this section I describe a version of the Mortensen-Pissarides model that I call the
vulnerable jobs model. It is consistent with the observed volatility of unemployment, the job-
separation rate and the job-￿nding rate. The model is a version of Fujita (2004) that I modify
to include permanent productivity di⁄erences across matches and wage rigidity. Fujita￿ s
model is a modi￿cation of den Haan et al. (2000), omitting capital and consumption. Their
model is a discrete time version of Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) with two modi￿cations:
match speci￿c shocks are i.i.d. and aggregate productivity follows an AR(1) process.
To model permanent productivity di⁄erences across matches I allow the model to have
two types of jobs: a good job and a bad job. The bad job has productivity a fraction
permanently lower than the productivity of the good job. Each job is also hit with an i.i.d.
idiosyncratic productivity shock every period. With some exogenous probability workers
4can transition from the good job to the bad job. Workers separate from the bad job into
unemployment when the value of unemployment exceeds the value of the match.
My second main departure from the MP framework if the inclusion of wage rigidity.
Shimer (2005a) demonstrates that the Mortensen-Pissarides model does not generate su¢ -
cient unemployment volatility when workers￿outside options are low. Finding this also to
be the case for my model as well, I add wage stickiness, as in Hall (2005a), to increase the
model￿ s ability to generate unemployment volatility.
Because wages are rigid, they may be, at times, too high. If the match receives a shock
below a certain threshold, the ￿rm will want to sever the match. I assume that if the ￿rm is
hit with a shock which would lead it to ￿re the worker, the wage adjusts so the ￿rm￿ s share
of the surplus is zero. This adjustment avoids an ine¢ cient separation. I now proceed to a
formal description of the model
2.1.2 Match Productivity
At the beginning of the period there is a mass of worker-￿rm matches in the good job
and a mass of worker-￿rm matches in the bad job. Workers maximize expected discounted
lifetime income. Firms maximize expected discounted pro￿ts. A fraction ￿x of matches
exogenously separates into unemployment1. Then, a fraction q of the jobs with the good
technology are hit with a shock that permanently lowers their productivity to that of the
bad technology. The remaining good matches have an option to produce according to the
following technology z
g
i yt with z
g
i distributed lognormal with mean 0 and variance ￿z;g. In
addition, the workers who occupy the bad jobs can produce using the technology ￿z￿
iyt with
￿ < 1 and with z￿
i distributed lognormal with mean 0 and variance ￿￿. yt represents aggregate
productivity, which follows the AR(1) process lnyt = ￿lnyt￿1 + "t:
1Exogenous separation can be thought of as needing to leave a job for personal reasons or as receiving a
permanent shock that destroys the value of the job.
52.1.3 Match Surplus and Separation
After observing the idiosyncratic and aggregate levels of productivity, the pairs calculate













t ￿ (Ut + b) (1)
G
g
t represents the expected future discounted value to the ￿rm and the worker if they remain
in the good match today, G￿
t is the analog for the bad match. Ut represents the future
bene￿ts that will accrue to the worker if she is unemployed this period, and b represents the
￿ ow value of being unemployed. Note that the surplus is the value of the match in excess
of the worker￿ s outside option, the value of unemployment. The ￿rm￿ s outside option is
normalized to zero.
There is a threshold value of idiosyncratic productivity below which the surplus is zero
and the match is terminated:
0 = z
￿;g
t yt + G
g
t ￿ (Ut + b) and 0 = ￿z
￿;￿
t yt + G
￿
t ￿ (Ut + b) (2)
























t denote the fraction of the labor force who begin the period employed in a good
job and n￿
t the fraction who begin the period employed in a bad job, the overall separation
rate is equal to the exogenous separation rate plus a weighted average of two endogenous
separation rates.
￿


























6To interpret this formula, note that before separation occurs a fraction q of the good matches








The standard MP model assumes that wages are perfectly ￿ exible and adjust so that
the ￿rm gets a share ￿ of the surplus. In this model I take the approach of Hall (2005a)
and assume that wages are not perfectly ￿ exible. Instead, wages are a weighted average
between the wage that would give the ￿rm a share ￿ of the surplus and a wage norm. This
assumption allows the share of the surplus going to the ￿rm to vary over time. After a
negative productivity shock, the wage does not adjust fully downward and the ￿rm gets a
share smaller than ￿ of the surplus. This reduces their incentive to recruit and lowers the
job-￿nding rate. This mechanism can generate additional volatility in job-￿nding. Wages
then are given by:
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t ￿ Ut)) (5)
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t ￿ Ut)) (6)
where F
g
t is the future expected discounted payments that accrue to the ￿rm from the good
match. F ￿




t ￿ Ut) is the wage
that, when paid, would give the ￿rm a share ￿ of the total surplus in the good match. The
analog condition holds for the bad match. wt represents a wage norm that will be de￿ned
shortly. ￿ is a measure of wage stickiness. The closer ￿ is to one, the more rigid are wages.
Since wages are rigid, it is possible that the idiosyncratic productivity level is low enough
that the ￿rm would want to ￿re the worker when there is positive value in the match. The
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t = ￿wt + (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)￿z
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t ￿Ut)] and the value of the bad match to the ￿rm
￿z￿
tyt+F ￿




If the ￿rm would want to ￿re the worker at the wage given by the wage norm, I assume
that the wage adjusts so that the ￿rm￿ s share of the surplus is equal to zero, i.e. the ￿rm is
indi⁄erent between keeping or ￿ring the worker. In this case the wage in the good job would
equal zityt + F
g
t and the wage in the bad job would equal ￿zityt + F ￿
t :






































































average wage is the weighted average of the average wage in the good job and the average
wage in the bad job. The weights are given by the employment shares in each type of job.
The average wage in each type of job takes into account the fact that between the e¢ cient
separation threshold and the ￿ring threshold the wage adjusts to make the ￿rm indi⁄erent
between keeping and ￿ring the worker.
82.1.5 Continuation Value Functions
To solve the model it is necessary to calculate the continuation values. The expected
future payments of the match to the ￿rm satisfy:
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t+1 ￿ziyt+1 ￿ w￿



















The ￿rm discounts future payments at a rate ￿; and the match remains with probability
(1 ￿ ￿x): If the idiosyncratic productivity shock is below zt+1, the ￿rm gets zero surplus. In
the region where the ￿rm gets positive value from the match, zi > zt+1, the match carries out
production. If the match is a good match the ￿rm collects ziyt+1, pays the worker w
g
t+1(zi),
and the match has continuation value F
g
t+1 to the ￿rm. Note that with probability q a match
that is good at the end of the period will become bad at the start of the next period. So in
that case the ￿rm collects ￿ziyt+1, pays the worker w￿
t+1(zi), and the match has continuation
value F ￿
t+1 to the ￿rm. For the bad match, there is no probability of transitioning to a
di⁄erent type of match. So the ￿rm￿ s surplus is ￿ziyt+1 ￿ w￿
t+1(zi) + F ￿
t+1 with probability
one.
The total expected payments from remaining in the match today which accrue to the
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t+1 ￿ Ut+1 ￿ b dH(z
￿
i) + Ut+1 + b
#
(13)
In the event that the match does not separate endogenously, when zi > z￿
t+1; the surplus of
the match is ziyt+1 + G
g
t+1 ￿ Ut+1 ￿ b for the good match and ￿ziyt+1 + G
g
t+1 ￿ Ut+1 ￿ b for
9the bad match. In any event, the worker is guaranteed her outside option Ut+1 + b:
Finally, the value of unemployment is:
Ut = ￿
2
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t+1(zi) = ziyt+1 +G
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t+1 ￿Ut+1 ￿b , E
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t+1(zi) = ￿ziyt+1 +G￿









t+1 ￿ Ut+1 ￿ b; and E￿
t+1(zi) = w￿
t+1(zi) + G￿
t+1 ￿ F ￿
t+1 ￿ Ut+1 ￿ b: This
formulation assumes that all matches begin as a good job and descend to the bad job with
probability q:
The worker ￿nds a job with probability mt
ut (the number of matches per unemployed
worker) and with probability (1 ￿ ￿x) the match does not separate exogenously. With
probability q the match turns out to be bad. With probability 1 ￿ q it stays good. In
the region [z￿
t+1;zt+1] the worker receives a surplus value of employment equal to the whole
surplus E
g
t+1(zi) = ziyt+1 + G
g
t+1 ￿ Ut+1 ￿ b for the good job and E
￿
t+1(zi) = ￿ziyt+1 +
G￿
t+1 ￿ Ut+1 ￿ b for the bad job. For the productivity shocks zi > zt+1 the worker receives














. In all cases, the worker receives her outside option Ut+1 + b:
2.1.6 Unemployment Dynamics
Unemployment evolves according to:
ut = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿
x)(1 ￿ ￿
n;g
t )(1 ￿ q)n
g










t is the stock of good jobs at the beginning of the period and n￿
t is the stock of bad
jobs at the beginning of the period. The total size of the labor force is normalized to one.
The unemployed workforce is the whole labor force, 1, minus the fraction (1 ￿ ￿x)(1 ￿ ￿
n;g
t )
of good matches that do not separate multiplied by the number of good matches (1 ￿ q)n
g
t
minus the fraction (1 ￿ ￿x)(1 ￿ ￿
n;￿
t ) of bad matches that do not separate multiplied by the




The next two equations determine the equilibrium number of matches and vacancies.










t is the value today of ￿lling a vacancy and mt
vt is the likelihood that the vacancy is ￿lled.
The following function determines the number of matches:
mt =
utvt
(uL + vL) 1
L
(17)
This function, introduced by den Haan et al. (2000), ensures that mt
vt and mt
ut are always
between zero and one, a useful property for estimating the model. Therefore, I use this
matching function instead of the more conventional Cobb-Douglas formulation. This match-
ing function exhibits constant returns to scale and m is increasing in u and v: Moreover,
m
v and the ￿nding rate, m
u ; are decreasing in v and u respectively. This type of random
matching function is meant to model frictions in the labor market. Unemployed workers
cannot immediately ￿nd a job, but do so randomly with a probability less than one.
Lastly, next period￿ s employment stocks are
n
g
t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿
x)(1 ￿ ￿
n;g
t )(1 ￿ q)n
g
t + mt (18)
n
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112.2 Empirical Motivation for Vulnerable Jobs
The two di⁄erent types of jobs can be thought of as di⁄erent areas of the labor market.
Some areas are more productive than others due to the availability of resources, institutions,
and the current industry mix. High-productivity areas can transition to low-productivity
areas due to the obsolescence of technology or changes in the availability of resources. The
assumption that all matches start out as good matches is an assumption that ￿rms only create
jobs in high productivity areas. The absence of on-the-job search in this model signi￿es that
in order to ￿nd a more productive job workers have to leave their geographic areas, enduring
at least a period of unemployment.
Jacobson et al. (1993) (JLS) ￿nd that workers experience wage losses before separation
occurs. This fact is consistent with the model￿ s assumption that separations come from
matches that have had consistently low productivity. The ￿nding that wage losses occur
before separation is echoed in Hamermesh (1988). There is less evidence on the importance
of mobility and job search. However, JLS show that workers who separate in areas with worse
labor markets have substantially larger losses from unemployment. Therefore, workers have
incentive to be mobile in unemployment and to search in labor markets di⁄erent from their
own. It is worth noting that my model is not completely consistent with the JLS evidence.
My model, like the original MP model, assumes that when unemployed workers ￿nd a new
job they are employed at the highest productivity level. JLS ￿nd substantial wages losses
that persist with separated workers even onto future jobs.
2.3 Empirical Motivation for Wage Rigidity
Real-wage rigidity is an important feature of the model in this paper. As pointed out
by Shimer (2005a), the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model does not generate su¢ cient
volatility in unemployment and vacancies. Hall (2005a) notes that the model￿ s ampli￿cation
mechanisms are greatly improved by adding real wage rigidity. This is true even if the
wage is allowed to adjust to avoid ine¢ cient separations. Substantial real-wage rigidity
12moves the model towards paying the worker a wage that does not vary much with the state
of aggregate productivity. As a result, the ￿rm keeps most of the gains from aggregate-
productivity increases and absorbs most of the losses of aggregate-productivity decreases.
This mechanism makes the ￿rm￿ s recruiting incentives highly procyclical, generating variance
in unemployment and vacancies through the ￿nding rate. For my purposes, it is important
to have a model that can generate volatility in unemployment and vacancies close to that in
the data, hence the prominent role of real wage rigidity.
Beyond the empirical necessity, additional research points to the importance of real wage
rigidity. Hall (2005a) argues that there is a social consensus as to what the fair wage
is and that a sense of a fair wage may a⁄ect wage setting. Akerlof et al. (1996) and
Bewley (1999) support this view as well. Falk et al. (2006) introduce minimum wages
in experimental settings. They ￿nd introducing minimum wages raises reservations wages.
Even after removing the minimum wage, the reservation wages remain higher than before.
They argue that the minimum wage shapes what subjects consider a fair wage.
While the average wage￿ s relative acyclicality is well known, the cyclicality of new hires￿
wages is currently an active research area. As noted by Pissarides (2009) and Haefke et al.
(2008), in a sample of those who have begun work recently, wages are much more sensitive
to unemployment or aggregate productivity than the average wage. This evidence would
seem to cast doubt on the ability of wage rigidity to explain ￿ uctuations in job-￿nding.
However, as Gertler & Trigari (2006) argue, these studies fail to control for changes in the
type of job at which workers work. For example, if in recessions workers transition more
from well paying jobs (e.g. manufacturing) to poorer paying jobs (e.g. retail), wages will
be very sensitive to aggregate productivity. After controlling for job-speci￿c characteristics,
they ￿nd that wages of new hires are no more sensitive to the aggregate state of the economy
than current employees. In my models there is only one type of job that workers can be
hired into, therfore I take the Gertler and Triagari evidence as more relevant for evaluating
the realism of the model.
133 Model Solution, Estimation, and Results
3.1 Model Solution
I solve the model by calculating, numerically, the non-stochastic steady state. Then I
log-linearize the dynamics around this steady state. To obtain the state space form of the
model I use the programs of King & Watson (2002). The steady state equations, along with
the equations for the linearized dynamics, are in a web appendix.2
3.2 Calibration
Table one contains the parameters that are calibrated and those that are estimated. The
discount factor in the model, ￿; is set to 0:99. A period is set to one quarter.
The exogenous separation rate, following Fujita (2004), is set to ￿x = 0:083: In the data,
2http://people.brandeis.edu/~tortoric/Papers/WebAppendix.pdf
14the quarterly separation rate is 0:098. Fujita (2004) calibrates the exogenous separation rate
based on Topel (1990). Topel de￿nes a displaced worker as one who has changed employers
since the previous year because: 1.) the company went out of business, 2.) the worker was
laid o⁄ or ￿red or 3.) the job was completed. Fujita equates endogenous separation (￿n)
with this type of separation. He then calculates the yearly probability of experiencing this
type of displacement from Topel. The yearly probability is 0:064, which implies a quarterly
probability of 0:016. Combining this statistic with the formula for the overall separation rate
0:098 = s = ￿x + (1 ￿ ￿x)￿n, Fujita obtains ￿x = 0:083:
Finally, the ￿rm￿ s Nash bargaining weight is set to ￿ = 0:5 (the value in Gertler & Trigari
(2006) and den Haan et al. (2000)). This choice is the most common in the literature and
not very di⁄erent from the recent estimate of Flinn (2006), who ￿nds ￿ = 0:597: Robustness
to the choice of ￿x and ￿ is shown in section ￿ve. Note that the choice of ￿ only determines
the split in steady state. Real-wage rigidity induces variability in how the surplus is split
over time. In high-productivity times the ￿rm receives the majority of the surplus. In low
productivity times the worker gets most of the surplus.
To calibrate the parameters of the productivity process I match the variance and the
autocorrelation of labor-productivity in the data3. All other parameters are estimated by
GMM or exogenously varied to study di⁄erent scenarios.
3.3 Estimation
To estimate the parameters by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), I solve
b ￿ = argmingT(￿)WgT(￿)
0 (20)



































hp is HP ￿ltered labor productivity in logarithms from Shimer (2005a)￿ s data and b y
hp
t is the model￿ s
prediction for HP ￿ltered log deviation of productivity from its steady state.
15where gT(￿) = ET(ut(￿)): The vector ut(￿) is the vector whose expectation is the di⁄erence
between the moments in the data and those predicted by the model. The moments I use
are: the variances of and covariances between unemployment, vacancies, ￿nding rate, and
separation rate. In addition I include the mean of the ￿nding rate and separation rate.4
I use the two-step, e¢ cient GMM procedure, ￿rst using the identity matrix as the weight-
ing matrix and using the resulting parameters to calculate the Newey & West (1987) esti-












(ut ￿ Et(ut))(ut￿j ￿ Et(ut￿j))
0 (21)
In my estimation I set k = 5. Then I use b S￿1 as the second stage weighting matrix. Finally,
the following formula is used for the standard errors5:






























Here ￿ is the vector of non-estimated parameters listed in Table 1. ￿ = f￿;￿x;￿;￿;￿"g:
￿f = V ar(￿): The appendix discusses estimation of ￿f: Note that for the case where the
variance of the non-estimated parameters is assumed to be zero the formula reduces to the





: For all moments in the data I use the logarithm of
HP ￿ltered data. I compare these data moments to the moments of the HP ￿ltered model
variables in log deviations from steady state. See Burnside (1999) for the justi￿cation of this
estimation strategy and the appendix of this paper for a description of Burnside￿ s method
for obtaining the log HP ￿ltered moments of the model.
4Estimation of the constant separation rate model omits the covariances between the separation rate and
the other variables.
5See Laibson et al. (2007) for a derivation.
163.4 Data
The data come from Shimer (2005a). All data, except labor productivity, are quar-
terly averages of monthly series. Data begin in 1951 and end in 2003. Unemployment
and labor-productivity data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The series on
vacancies comes from the Conference Board￿ s Help Wanted advertisements series. Shimer
(2005b) constructs series for the job-￿nding rates and job-separation rates from the BLS￿ s
Current Population Survey (CPS). All data are expressed in logarithms and HP ￿ltered with
a smoothing parameter 105: Additionally, ￿nding and separation rates are set to quarterly
rates using the following formula: xq = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ xm)3: The likelihood of ￿nding a job in a
quarter is one minus the likelihood of not ￿nding a job for three months.
3.5 Vulnerable Jobs Model Results
Table two, column labeled Model 1, contains the results from estimating the vulner-
able jobs model. The model predicts a standard deviation of unemployement equal to
0.14 close to the 0.19 in the data. The model also almost exactly matches the observed
standard deviation of the job-￿nding rate: the model predicts 0:059, in the data it is 0:058.
The model predicts a standard deviation for the separation rate of 0:106; in the data it is
0:073. High-productivity jobs ￿ ow to the lower productivity state with a probability (q) of
6:2% per quarter. The lower productivity state (￿) is, on average, 25% less productive.
The model predicts all the correct signs for the correlation coe¢ cients. The model￿ s major
shortcoming is its prediction that all the main variables should be very highly correlated.
This is not, in fact, the case in the data, though all the correlation coe¢ cients are greater
(in absolute value) than 0:5:
The estimated value for the worker￿ s outside option, b, is 0:79. This number is higher
than b = 0:75 which I take to be the upper end of the admissable values of b based on
the evidence of Costain & Reiter (2003). To be certain that the vulnerable-jobs model can
match the data moments when b = 0:75, I re-estimate the model under this restriction (Table
17182, Column: Model 2). The predicted moments are similar to the unrestricted version; the
biggest discrepancy comes in its prediction for the volatility of vacancies. The restricted
model predicts a standard deviation of 0:17 while the unrestricted model predicts a standard
deviation of 0:19: In the data the standard deviation of vacancies is 0:2:
Since the model has two jobs with di⁄ering productivity it may not be immediately clear
how to express the outside option as a percent of the average value of unemployment. To
facilitate this comparison the table reports the average wage in the economy. It is 0.97 for
the model with b = 0.79 and 0.95 for the model with b = 0.75. I also report the elasticity
of unemployment to changes in (b) the ￿ ow value of unemployment. They are 4.3 and 5.3
respectively, a substantial improvement over the elasticity of 14 implied by the Hagedorn &
Manovskii (2006) (b=.96) calibration.
4 Constant Separation Rate Model
4.1 Theoretical Model
Can the model explain the volatility of unemployment without a variable separation
rate? I ￿nd that it cannot. I remove the permanent shocks from the vulnerable jobs model￿
therefore removing any incentive to separate￿and then re-estimate the model. This allows
me to ￿nd the best ￿tting model with a constant separation rate. I therefore ￿nd that no
calibration of the constant separation rate model satisfactorily explains the data by searching
over the entire parameter space.
The equations for the constant separation rate model are obtained by taking the equations
from the vulnerable jobs model and omitting the equations that describe the bad job. Then,
in the remaining equations one sets n￿ , ￿n;￿ and q = 0. A full description of the model
equations is available in the web appendix mentioned in section 3.1.
194.2 Constant Separation Results
Table three gives the parameters of the constant, e¢ cient separation model and table
four presents the results from estimating the constant separation rate model. I set b (the
￿ ow value of unemployment) equal to 0:75:6 I then estimate the remaining parameters ￿z
(the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock), c (the cost of posting a vacancy), ￿ (the
weight on the wage norm), and L (the matching function parameter). The estimation drives
￿ to 1; a ￿xed wage is necessary to generate enough volatility in unemployment. Thus I set
￿ = 0:99999 and re-estimate the model.
First, note that the model generates no volatility in the separation rate. The standard
deviation of the separation rate is essentially zero. Worker outside options are low enough
that without permanent productivity shocks the value of the job never falls below the value
of the workers outside option.
The key observation in this section is that despite searching over the entire parameter
6Estimation of b drives the parameter to 1. Based on the evidence in section 1, I reject models with near
indi⁄erence between work and unemployment. Therefore, I calibrate b based on the evidence of Costain &
Reiter (2003).
20space the overall ￿t of the model is poor. Since variation in the ￿nding rate is the only
channel generating unemployment volatility, the model predicts ￿nding rate volatility and
a vacancy volatility that is much higher than in the data. The model predicts that the
standard deviation of the ￿nding rate should be 0:1 vs. 0:058 in the data. Even with a
￿nding rate almost twice as volatile as the data, the model underestimates the volatility of
unemployment. The model predicts that unemployment volatility should be 0:09 versus the
0:19 found in the data.
So then, do models of unemployment ￿ uctuations need separation rate volatility? The
answer is a resounding yes. Firstly, even the best ￿tting model without separation rate
volatility, found by searching over the whole parameter space, does not explain the volatility
of unemployment and even does a poor job predicting the volatility of the job-￿nding rate.
Secondly, as shown in the previous section, adding in separation rate volatility substan-
tially improves the ability of the model to predict the volatilities of all the main variables:
unemployment rate, vacancies, job-￿nding rate and the job-separation rate.
21One might be concerned that the transition from two jobs with di⁄ering productivity to
one job has e⁄ects on dynamics in addition to its e⁄ect on the separation rate. To alleviate
these concerns I report the average wage for this version of the model. It is 0:98 versus 0:97
for the previous model. Therefore, going from two jobs to one job does not substantially
a⁄ect the average value of work.
Another concern may be my use of only technology shocks in estimation. I make this
choice to be consistent with the literature and to keep clear the mechanism driving the results.
The mechanism is simple: the ￿nding rate is not volatile enough for a model to explain the
unemployment volatility solely through that channel. This result is most surely robust to
the inclusion of additional shocks. These shocks may raise the volatility of unemployment,
but in a constant separation rate model they must do it through the job-￿nding rate leading
to too much volatility in job-￿nding. Similarly, the reliance on wage rigidity can be thought
of as a simple stand in for other mechanisms that may increase ￿nding rate volatility. While
additional mechanisms (for example variation in the cost of vacancy posting) may raise the
volatility of unemployment, they would do so by increasing the volatility of the job ￿nding
rate and leading to too much ￿nding rate volatility.
5 Robustness
5.1 Non-Estimated Parameters
This section explores the robustness of model dynamics to changes in the non-estimated
parameters. I con￿rm that I can replicate the model￿ s predictions for the moments under
di⁄erent assumptions about the non-estimated parameters. I focus on the model￿ s dynamics
under di⁄erent assumptions for ￿x and ￿: I re-calculate the moments of each model, varying
these parameters using the estimated values for the other parameters. The benchmark
value is ￿x = 0:083: I recalculate the moments setting ￿x = 0:1 and ￿x = 0:064: For these
calibrations I keep ￿ = 0:5: Next, I keep ￿x = 0:083 and set ￿ = 0:4 and then ￿ = 0:6:
22Often the moments of the model do not change at all. When the moments do change,
I can easily restore them with reasonable changes in the estimated parameters. For exam-
ple, lowering ￿x increases the value of the worker to a ￿rm, which a⁄ects the dynamics by
increasing the ￿nding rate. Increasing c, the cost of posting a vacancy, restores the original
dynamics. Similarly, changes in b can o⁄set increases in the ￿rm￿ s share of the surplus.7
The results are in table ￿ve. It is easy to replicate the model￿ s predictions under di⁄er-
ent assumptions about the non-estimated parameters. The conclusions are the same. The
vulnerable jobs model generates endogenous separation and ￿ts the data fairly well. The
constant separation rate continues to ￿t the data poorly.
5.2 Monthly Results
I calibrated my model to quarterly data. As a result, I adjust the Shimer data so that
the ￿nding rate is expressed as a quarterly rate and calculate the standard deviation of this
variable. Shimer, on the other hand, stresses the standard deviation of the quarterly average
7The ￿nal section of the appendix documents all parameter changes.
23of the monthly rate. Since this is an arithmetic average, not a geometric average, the ￿nding
rate variance changes substantially under the two methods. Given that the monthly ￿nding
rate is high, about 40%; the quarterly ￿nding rate is close to one (about 80%) and is therefore
less variable then the monthly rate.
In this paper, I conclude that the separation rate helps the model better ￿t the unem-
ployment ￿ uctuations data. I now con￿rm that this result is not driven by the quarterly
calibration. I re-estimate the models, calibrating the model to the monthly data. To smooth
the series, I follow Ravn & Uhlig (1997) and use a smoothing parameter of 129;600 for the
monthly data.8 The results are in Table 6. The higher monthly ￿nding rate variance helps
the constant separation rate model ￿t the data better. However, it still overestimate the
variance of vacancies by about 25% and the variance of the ￿nding rate by about 50%. In
contrast, the endogenous separation rate model generates the same amount of unemployment
volatility and does not overestimate the volatility of vacancies and the ￿nding rate.
5.3 On-the-job search
For the constant separation rate model explored in this paper, on-the-job search is ir-
relevant, since there is no job heterogeneity lasting more than one period. However, the
vulnerable jobs model does have persistent di⁄erences in job type. As a result, adding on-
the-job search may change the dynamics of this model. While a full model of on-the-job
8Using this parameter the standard deviation of unemployment falls when compared to the quarterly
data. This is because Shimer uses an extremely high smoothing parameter (100;000) for quarterly data.
24search is beyond the scope of this paper, one can speculate about what would happen if on-
the-job search were added. On-the-job search will raise the value of the bad job to the worker,
lowering the rate of separation from this job. For small amounts of on-the-job search, this
increased value of the job could be o⁄set by lowering ￿ (the bad job￿ s productivity fraction).
Therefore, the results are most likely robust to the inclusion of on-the-job search.
6 Conclusion
Current research evaluating the Mortensen-Pissarides model can be broadly placed into
two categories. One set of models uses wage rigidity to create substantial volatility in the
job-￿nding rate, but assumes constant separation rates. Another set of models allows for
endogenous separation but omits wage rigidity and does not generate su¢ cient volatility
in the job-￿nding rate. As a result, neither set of models is equipped to fully evaluate
the importance of separation rate volatility in explaining unemployment ￿ uctuations. In
this paper, I estimate a version of the MP model with endogenous separation and wage
rigidity. The model is consistent with both the volatility of the job-￿nding rate and the
job-separation rate. I show that an estimated version of the model where the job-separation
rate is constant fails to explain the volatility of unemployment and greatly overestimates
the volatility of the ￿nding rate. Job separation rate volatility then is necessary to explain
unemployment ￿ uctuations.
There were two key shortcomings of the model. First, it predicted that unemployment,
vacancies, the job-￿nding rate and the job-separation rate are almost perfectly correlated. In
fact, while the correlations are high in the data, they are far from one. Allowing additional
shocks may reduce this correlation. Since I solve the model by linearizing around the steady
state, it is possible to add additional shocks without losing tractability. Second, the models
implied a fairly rigid wage. This result suggests that additional mechanisms in addition to
wage rigidity may be needed to better match data on average wage volatility.
25References
Akerlof, George, Dickens, William T., & Perry, George. 1996. The macroeco-
nomics of low in￿ ation. Brookings papers on economic activity, 0(1), 1￿ 59.
Bewley, Truman. 1999. Why wages don￿ t fall during a recssions. Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press.
Burnside, Craig. 1999. Real business cycle models: Linear approximation and gmm
estimation. Mimeo world bank, May.
Costain, James S., & Reiter, Michael. 2003. Business cycles, unemployment insurance,
and the calibration of matching models. Department of economics and business, universitat
pompeu fabra working paper, June.
den Haan, Wouter J., Ramey, Garey, & Watson, Joel. 2000. Job destruction and
propagation of shocks. American economic review, 90(3), 482￿ 498.
Elsby, Michael W., Michaels, Ryan, & Solon, Gary. 2007. The ins and outs of
cyclical unemployment. National bureau of economic research working paper 12853, Jan.
Falk, Armin, Fehr, Ernst, & Zehnder, Christian. 2006. The behavioral e⁄ects of
minimum wages. The quarterly journal of economics, NOvember, 1347￿ 1381.
Flinn, Christopher J. 2006. Minimum wage e⁄ects on labor market outcomes under
search, matching, and endogenous contact rates. Econometrica, 74(4), 1013￿ 1062.
Fujita, Shigeru. 2004. Vacancy persistence. Federal reserve bank of philadelphia working
paper, October.
Gertler, Mark, & Trigari, Antonella. 2006. Unemployment ￿ uctuations with stag-
gered nash wage bargaining. National bureau of economic research, working paper 12498,
Aug.
Haefke, Christian, Sonntag, Marcus, & vam Rens, Thijs. 2008. Wage rigidity and
job creation. Mimeo.
Hagedorn, Marcus, & Manovskii, Iourii. 2006. The cyclical behavior of equilibrium
unemployment and vacancies revisited. University of chicago mimeo, April.
Hall, Robert, & Milgrom, Paul. 2008. The limited in￿ uence of employment on the
wage bargain. American economic review, 98, 1653￿ 74.
Hall, Robert E. 2005a. Employment ￿ uctuations with equilibrium wage stickiness. Amer-
ican economic review, 95(1), 50￿ 65.
Hall, Robert E. 2005b. Job loss, job ￿nding, and unemployment in the u.s. economy over
the past ￿fty years. National bureau of economic research, macroeconomics annual, Oct.
26Hamermesh, Daniel S. 1988. Plant closings, labor demand and the value of the ￿rm.
Review of economics and statistics, Nov., 580￿ 586.
Jacobson, Louis S, LaLonde, Robert J, & Sullivan, Daniel G. 1993. Earnings
losses of displaced workers. American economic review, 83(4), 685￿ 709.
King, Robert G., & Rebelo, Sergio T. 1993. Low frequency ￿ltering and real business
cycles. Journal of economic dynamics and control, 17(1-2), 207￿ 231.
King, Robert G, & Watson, Mark W. 2002. System reduction and solution algo-
rithms for singular linear di⁄erence systems under rational expectations. Computational
economics, 20(1-2), 57￿ 86.
Laibson, David, Repetto, Andrea, & Tobacam, Jeremy. 2007. Estimating discount
functions with consumption choices over the lifecycle. Harvard department of economics
working paper.
Menzio, Guido, & Shi, Shouyong. 2009. Endogenous vs. exogenous separation. Penn
institute for economic research mimeo, February.
Mortensen, Dale T, & Pissarides, Christopher A. 1994. Job creation and job
destruction in the theory of unemployment. Review of economic studies, 61(3), 397￿ 415.
Newey, Whitney K, & West, Kenneth D. 1987. A simple, positive semi-de￿nite,
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix. Econometrica, 55(3),
703￿ 08.
Pissarides, Christopher. 2009. The unemployment volatility puzzle: is wage stickiness
the answer. Econometrica, 77, 1339￿ 1369.
Ramey, Garey. 2008. Endogenous vs. exogenous separation. mimeo, October.
Ravn, M.O., & Uhlig, H. 1997. On adjusting the hp-￿lter for the frequency of observations.
Tilburg university, center for economic research discussion paper.
Shimer, Robert. 2005a. The cyclical behavior of equilibrium unemployment and vacancies.
American economic review, 95(1), 25￿ 49.
Shimer, Robert. 2005b. Reassessing the ins and outs of unemployment. University of
chicago, mimeo, January.
Topel, Robert. 1990. Speci￿c capital and unemployment: Measuring the costs and con-
sequences of job loss. Carnegie-rochester conference series on public policy, 33, 181￿ 214.
27A Moment Calculation
To calculate the Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered moments of the linearized model I follow the
methodology of Burnside (1999). Using the programs provided by King & Watson (2002), I
can obtain the model in state space form
st+1 = Mst + "t (23)
xt = Hst (24)




































where N ￿ M ￿ i:
To calculate this formula we must ￿rst decompose M = V DV ￿1 where D is a diagonal
matrix with the eigenvalues of M on the diagonal and V contains the corresponding eigen















0 : Then ￿s
o = V e ￿0V








Finally, since I use a smoothing parameter of 105 to match Shimer (2005a), my bj depart
from Burnside. According to King & Rebelo (1993), the correct bj = rja1 cos(jmjj) +
a2 sin(jmjj) where r = :961; a1 = :0199; jmj = :0398; and a2 = :0199:
28B Covariance Matrix of Non-Estimated Parameters
Let ￿ = f￿;￿x;￿;￿;￿"g and ￿f = V ar(￿): I assume that all parameters are independent
of each other except for ￿ and ￿", the AR(1) coe¢ cient and the standard deviation of the
exogenous productivity shock. Therefore all o⁄-diagonal elements of ￿f are zero except
for the term for the covariance between ￿ and ￿":To estimate the var(￿) I assume ￿ =
E[1=(1 + rt)] where rt is the real interest rate on the 3-month t-bill. Using a Newey-West
estimator of this mean I ￿nd a standard error for ￿ equal to 0:002. This estimate was the
maximum over several lag choices for the Newey-West estimator.
To estimate var(￿x), ￿rst note that given the overall mean of the separation rate one can
write 0:098 = s = ￿x+(1￿￿x)￿n and ￿x =
:098￿￿n
1￿￿n : Topel (1990), in a sample of about 23;300
workers from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), ￿nds that the average yearly








where Xi = 0 with probability 0:936 and 1 with probability 0:064: Assuming the X0
is are inde-
pendent, and given the variance of a binary variable, we have var(￿y) = 1
23000(:936)(:064): We
can write the quarterly separation rate as ￿n = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿y)
1
4: Applying the delta method,












var(￿y): Finally, ￿x =
:098￿￿n








uating this formula yields a standard error for ￿x = 0:00039:
There are few estimates for ￿; the ￿rm￿ s bargaining share. I take the standard error of
￿ from Flinn (2006) who ￿nds ￿ = 0:597 9 with a standard error of 0:003: To be consistent
with the literature, I take ￿ = 0:5; but show my results are robust to Flinn￿ s estimate in the
robustness section.
Finally, as mentioned in the text, ￿ and ￿" the AR(1) coe¢ cient and the standard
9Flinn estimates the worker￿ s bargaining share which is 1 ￿ ￿: He ￿nds this value to be 0:403:
29deviation of the exogenous productivity process are estimated by matching the variance
and autocovariance of US labor productivity. The results of this GMM estimation yield a
standard error for ￿ = 0:07 and a standard error for ￿" = 0:0092:
C Parameter Changes For Robustness Table
Many rows do not change. These are rows: 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12. For row 4, I
increase b to 0:6. For row 5, I lower b to 0:1. For row 9, I increase b to 0:955. For row 13, I
decrease ￿￿ to 0:72. For row 14, I increase b to 0:81. For row 15, I decrease b to 0:77.
30